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Abstract. When agents operate in a society with incomplete information and with di-
verse and conflicting influences, they may, in certain instances, lack the knowledge, the
motivation and/or the capacity to enact all their commitments. However, to function as a
coherent society it is important for these agents to have a means to resolve such conflicts
and to come to a mutual understanding about their actions. To this end, argumentation-
based negotiation provides agents with an effective means to resolve conflicts within a
multi-agent society. However, to engage in such argumentative encounters, agents require
four fundamental capabilities; a schema to reason in a social context, a mechanism to iden-
tify a suitable set of arguments, a language and a protocol to exchange these arguments,
and a decision making functionality to generate such dialogues. This paper presents for-
mulations of all of these capabilities and proposes a coherent framework that allows agents
to argue, negotiate, and, thereby, resolve conflicts within a multi-agent society.
Key words: Argumentation-based Negotiation, Conflict Resolution.
1 Introduction
Autonomous agents usually operate as a multi-agent community performing actions within a
shared social context to achieve their individual and collective objectives. In such a social con-
text, their actions are influenced via two broad forms of motivations. First, the internal influ-
ences reflect the intrinsic motivations that drive the individual agent to achieve its own internal
objectives. Second, as agents reside and operate within a social community, the social context
itself influences their actions. Here, we categorise these latter forms as social influences. Now,
in many cases, both these forms of influence may be present and they may give conflicting mo-
tivations to the individual agent. For instance, an agent may be internally motivated to perform a
specific action, whereas, at the same time, it may also be subject to an external social influence
not to perform it. Also an agent may face situations where different social influences motivate
it in a contradictory fashion (one to perform a specific action and the other not to). Moreover,
in many cases, agents have to carry out their actions in environments with incomplete infor-
mation. Thus, for instance, they may not be aware of the existence of all the social influences
that could or indeed should affect their actions and they may also lack the knowledge of certain
specific internal influences that drive other agents’ behaviours. Therefore, when agents operate
in a society of incomplete information with such diverse and conflicting influences, they may,
in certain instances, lack the knowledge, the motivation and/or the capacity to abide by all their
social influences.
However, to function as a coherent society it is important for these agents to have a means
to resolve such conflicts and to come to a mutual understanding about their actions. To this end,
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Argumentation-Based Negotiation (ABN) has been advocated as a promising means of resolv-
ing conflicts within such agent societies [1, 2]. In more detail, ABN allows agents to exchange
additional meta-information such as justifications, critics, and other forms of persuasive locu-
tions within their interactions. These, in turn, allow agents to gain a wider understanding of the
internal and social influences affecting their counterparts, thereby making it easier to resolve
certain conflicts that arise due to incomplete knowledge. Furthermore, the negotiation element
within ABN also provides a means for the agents to achieve mutually acceptable agreements to
the conflicts of interests that they may have in relation to their different influences.
Now, one of the central features required by an agent to engage in such arguments within
a society is the ability to generate valid arguments during the course of the dialogue. We be-
lieve this demands four fundamental capabilities: (i) a schema to reason in social settings; (ii) a
mechanism to identify a suitable set of arguments; (iii) a language and a protocol to exchange
these arguments; and (iv) a decision making functionality to generate such dialogues. This pa-
per builds upon our previous conceptual grounding [3] and formulates a coherent framework
that addresses all four of these issues. More specifically, apart from formulating a coherent
schema that captures social influence in multi-agent systems (see Section 2.1) and systemati-
cally using it, in turn, to identify social arguments to resolve conflicts within an agent society
(see Section 2.2), this paper presents three additional contributions. First, we construct a lan-
guage that is capable of expressing such social arguments and, which allows agents to exchange
them within their argumentative dialogues (see Section 3.1). Second, we define a dialogue game
protocol identifying the different guidelines (such as locution rules, structural rules and commit-
ment rules) which will govern these dialogues and guide its participants toward resolving their
conflicts. Finally, we define the different decision making algorithms required by the agents to
engage in such argumentative dialogues to resolve conflicts about their social influences (see
Section 3.2).
2 Model for Arguing with Social Influences
Here we outline our ABN model that provides agents with a means to argue, negotiate, and,
thereby, resolve their conflicts in relation to social influences. We introduce our model in two
stages; first detailing how social influences within a society can be captured into a schema, and
second explaining the different ways that agents can use this schema to systematically capture
arguments to use within their ABN in a multi-agent community.
2.1 Capturing Social Influence
The notion of social commitment acts as our basic building block for capturing social influ-
ences. First introduced by Castelfranchi [4], it is one of the fundamental approaches for mod-
elling social behaviour among agents in multi-agent systems. In essence, a social commitment
(SCx→yθ ) is a commitment by one agent x (termed the debtor) to another y (termed the creditor)
to perform a stipulated action θ.1 Having defined such, Castelfranchi further explains the con-
sequences of a social commitment for both the agents involved. In detail, a social commitment
results in the debtor attaining an obligation toward the creditor, to perform the stipulated action.
The creditor, in turn, attains certain rights. These include the right to demand or require the per-
formance of the action, the right to question the non-performance of the action, and, in certain
instances, the right to make good any losses suffered due to its non-performance. We refer to
these rights the creditor gains as the rights to exert influence. This notion of social commitment
resulting in an obligation and rights to exert influence, allows us a means to capture social in-
fluences between two agents. Thus, when a certain agent is socially committed to another to
1 In the desire to maintain simplicity within our schema, we avoid incorporating the witness (see [4]) in
our model (as Castelfranchi did in his subsequent expositions).
perform a specific action, it subjects itself to the social influences of the other to perform that
action. The ensuing obligation, on one hand, allows us to capture how an agent gets subjected to
the social influence of another, whereas, the rights to exert influence, on the other hand, model
how an agent gains the ability to exert such social influence upon another. Thereby, the notion
of social commitment gives an elegant mechanism to capture social influence resulting between
two agents.
Given this basic building block for modelling social influence between specific pairs of
agents, we now proceed to explain how this notion is extended to capture social influences re-
sulting due to factors such as roles and relationships within a wider multi-agent society (i.e.,
those that rely on the structure of the society, rather than the specific individuals who happen to
be committed to one another). Specifically, since most relationships involve the related parties
carrying out certain actions for each other, we can view a relationship as an encapsulation of
social commitments between the associated roles. To illustrate this, consider the relationship
between the roles supervisor and student. For instance, assume the relationship socially influ-
ences the student to produce and hand over his thesis to the supervisor in a timely manner. This
influence we can perceive as a social commitment that exists between the roles supervisor and
student (the student is socially committed to the supervisor to perform the stipulated action).
As a consequence of this social commitment, the student attains an obligation toward the su-
pervisor to carry out this related action. On the other hand, the supervisor gains the right to
exert influence on the student by either demanding that he does so or through questioning his
non-performance. In a similar manner, the supervisor may be influenced to review and com-
ment on the thesis. This again is another social commitment associated with the relationship.
In this instance, it subjects the supervisor to an obligation to review the thesis while the student
gains the right to demand its performance. In this manner, social commitment again provides
an effective means to capture the social influences emanating through roles and relationships of
the society (independently of the specific agents who take on the roles). Given this descriptive
definition of our model, we now formulate these notions to capture the social influences within
multi-agent systems as a schema (refer to Figure 1 and formulae (1) through (6)):
Definition 1: For nA, nR, nP , nΘ ∈ N+, let:
• A = {a1, . . . , anA} denote a finite set of agents,
• R = {r1, . . . , rnR} denote a finite set of roles,
• P = {p1, . . . , pnP } denote a finite set of relationships,
• Θ = {θ1, . . . , θnΘ} denote a finite set of actions,
• Act : A×R denote the fact that an agent is acting a role,
• RoleOf : R× P denote the fact that a role is related to a relationship, and
• In : A×R× P denote the fact that an agent acting a role is part of a relationship.
If an agent acts a certain role and that role is related to a specific relationship, then that agent acting that
role is said to be part of that relationship (as per Cavedon and Sonenberg [5]):
Act(a, r) ∧ RoleOf(r, p) → In(a, r, p) (Rel. Rule)
Definition 2: Let SC denote a finite set of social commitments and SCx→yθ ∈ SC. Thus, as per Castel-
franchi, SCx→yθ will result in the debtor attaining an obligation toward the creditor to perform a stipulated
action and the creditor, in turn, attaining the right to influence the performance of that action:
SCx→yθ → [Ox→yθ ]fx ∧ [Ry→xθ ]y , (S-Com Rule)
where:
- [Ox→yθ ]
f
x
represents the obligation that x attains that subjects it to an influence of a degree f (refer
to [3] for more details) toward y to perform θ and
- [Ry→xθ ]y represents the right that y attains which gives it the ability to demand, question, and require
x regarding the performance of θ.
Definition 3: Let:
• DebtorOf : (R ∪A)× SC denote that a role (or an agent) is the debtor in a social commitment,
• CreditorOf : (R ∪A)× SC denote that a role (or an agent) is the creditor in a social commitment,
• ActionOf :Θ × SC denote that an act is associated with a social commitment, and
• AssocWith :SC × P denote that a social commitment is associated with a relationship.
An agent ai acting the role ri
Leads it to be part of the relationship p
With another agent aj acting the role rj
A social commitment SCri→rjθ associated with p
– Leads to ai attaining an obligation O toward rj ,
Which subjects it to an influence of degree f
To perform the action θ
– And, in turn, leads to aj attaining the right R toward ri
To demand, question, and require the performance of action θ
Fig. 1. Natural Language Representation of the Schema of Social Influence.
If the roles associated with the relationship are both the creditor and the debtor of a particular social com-
mitment, then we declare that social commitment is associated with the relationship (as per Section 2.1).
Applying the Rel. Rule to a society where: ai, aj ∈ A∧ ri, rj ∈ R ∧ p ∈ P s.t. Act(ai, ri), Act(aj , rj),
RoleOf(ri, p), RoleOf(rj , p) hold true, we obtain:
Act(ai, ri) ∧ RoleOf(ri, p) → In(ai, ri, p) (1)
Act(aj , rj) ∧ RoleOf(rj , p) → In(aj , rj , p). (2)
Now, consider a social commitment SCri→rjθ associated with the relationship p in this society. Applying
this to Definition 3 we obtain:
(DebtorOf(ri, SC) ∧ RoleOf(ri, p)) ∧ (CreditorOf(rj , SC) ∧ RoleOf(rj , p))
∧ ActionOf(θ, SC) → AssocWith(SCri→rjθ , p). (3)
Applying the S-Comm rule to SCri→rjθ we obtain:
SCri→rjθ →
ˆ
Ori→rjθ
˜f
ri
∧ ˆRrj→riθ ˜rj . (4)
Combining (4), (1) and (3) we obtain:
In(ai, ri, p) ∧ AssocWith(SCri→rjθ , p) →
ˆ
Oai→rjθ
˜f
ai
. (5)
Combining (4), (2) and (3) we obtain:
In(aj , rj , p) ∧ AssocWith(SCri→rjθ , p) →
ˆ
Raj→riθ
˜
aj
. (6)
2.2 Capturing Social Arguments
Having captured the notion of social influence into a schema, here we present how agents can
use it to systematically identify arguments to negotiate within a society. We term these argu-
ments social arguments, not only to emphasise their ability to resolve conflicts within a society,
but also to highlight the fact that they use the social influence present within the system as a
core means in changing decisions and outcomes within the society.2 Specifically, we have iden-
tified two major ways in which social influence can be used to change decisions and outcomes
and thereby resolve conflicts between agents (see Figure 2).
Socially Influencing Decisions: One way to affect an agent’s decisions is by arguing about
the validity of that agent’s practical reasoning [6, 7]. Similarly, in a social context, an agent can
affect another agent’s decisions by arguing about the validity of the other’s social reasoning. In
more detail, agents’ decisions to perform (or not to perform) actions are based on their internal
and/or social influences. Thus, these influences formulate the justification (or the reason) be-
hind their decisions. Therefore, agents can affect each other’s decisions indirectly by affecting
the social influences that determine their decisions (see Figure 2(a)). Specifically, in the case
of actions motivated via social influences through the roles and relationships of a structured
society, this justification to act (or not to act) flows from the social influence schema (see Sec-
tion 2.1). Given this, we can further classify the ways that agents can socially influence each
other’s decisions into two broad categories:
2 Due to space restrictions here we present only a limited subset of social arguments. For a comprehensive
list of arguments, together with their formal representation, refer to [3].
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Fig. 2. Interplay of Social Influence and Argumentation-Based Negotiation.
1. Undercut the opponent’s existing justification to perform (or not) an action by disputing
certain premises within the schema that motivates its opposing decision (i.e., dispute ai is
acting role ri, dispute SC is a social commitment associated with the relationship p, dispute
θ is the action associated with the obligation O, etc.).
2. Rebut the opposing decision to act (or not) by,
i. Pointing out information about an alternative schema that justifies the decision not to
act (or act as the case may be) (i.e., point out ai is also acting role ri, point out SC is
also a social commitment associated with the relationship p, point out θ is the action
associated with the obligation O, etc.).
ii. Pointing out information about conflicts that could or should prevent the opponent
from executing its opposing decision (i.e., point out conflicts between two existing
obligations, rights, and actions).
Negotiating Social Influence: Agents can also use social influences within their negotiations.
More specifically, instead of using social argumentation as a tool to affect decisions (as above),
agents can use negotiation as a tool for “trading social influences”. In other words, the social
influences are incorporated as additional parameters of the negotiation object itself [8] (see Fig-
ure 2(b)). For instance, an agent can promise to (or threaten not to) undertake one or many future
obligations if the other performs (or does not perform) a certain action. It can also promise not
to (or threaten to) exercise certain rights to influence one or many existing obligations if the
other performs (or does not perform) a certain action. In this manner, the agents can use their
obligations, rights, and even the relationship itself as parameters in their negotiations.
3 The Language, Protocol, and Decision Making Functionality
As mentioned in Section 1, our main objective is to formulate a society of agents that are capable
of resolving their conflicts through argumentation-based negotiations. To this end, Section 2
formulated a model that allows the agents to identify such arguments to resolve conflicts in
a social context. However, identifying such arguments is merely the first step. Agents also
require a means to express such arguments, a mechanism to govern their interactions and guide
them to resolve their conflicts, and a functionality to make decisions during the course of such
dialogues. To this end, we now present the language, the protocol, and the decision making
algorithms of our ABN framework.
3.1 The Language
The language plays an important role in an ABN framework. It not only allows agents to express
the content and construct their arguments, but also provides a means to communicate and ex-
change them within an argumentative dialogue. Highlighting these two distinct functionalities,
we define the language in our framework at two levels; namely the domain language and the
communication language. The former allows the agents to specify certain premises about their
social context and also the conflicts that they may face while executing actions within such a
REJECT ASSERT
OPEN−DIALOGUE PROPOSE ACCEPT CLOSE−DIALOGUE
CHALLENGE
Fig. 3. Dialogue Interaction Diagram.
context. The latter, on the other hand, provides agents with a means to express these arguments
and, thereby, engage in their discourse to resolve conflicts. Inspired by the works of Sierra et
al. [9], this two tier definition not only allows us an elegant way of structuring the language, but
also provides a means to easily reuse the communication component within a different context
merely by replacing its domain counterpart.
In more detail, our domain language consists of ten elocutionary particles. Of these, eight al-
low the agents to describe their social context and these flow naturally from our social influence
schema (i.e., Act, RoleOf, In, DebtorOf, CreditorOf, ActionOf, InfluenceOf, and AssocWith).
Due to space restrictions we avoid repeating these definitions here (see Section 2.1). Further-
more, we define two additional predicates that provide a means to express the conflicts that the
agents may face while executing their actions:
Definition 4: Let:
• do: A × Θ denote the fact that an agent is performing an action (expressed in the abbreviated form
do(θ) when the agent is unambiguous).
• Conflict: do(A×Θ)×do(A×Θ) denote the fact that performing the actions gives rise to a conflict.
On the other hand, our communication language consists of seven elocutionary particles (see
Table 1). Mainly inspired form the works of Amgoud et al. [10], MacKenzie’s system DC [11],
and McBurney et al. [12], these form the building blocks of our dialogue game protocol ex-
plained below (see Section 3.2). Furthermore, these collectively allow the agents to use both of
our identified methods of conflict resolution; namely socially influencing decisions and nego-
tiating social influences (see Section 2.2). Due to their integrated nature with our protocol, we
will detail their operational functionality and the decision making algorithms associated with
each of these locutions alongside the protocol (see Section 3.2).
3.2 The Protocol and the Decision Making Functionality
Given the language component of our ABN framework, we will now proceed to describe both
the protocol which governs its interaction and guides the agents to resolve their conflicts, and
the various decision making algorithms that would enable the individual agents to participate
in such encounters.3 While the overall structure of our protocol is inspired from the work on
computational conflicts by Tessier et al. [13], the works on pragma-dialectics proposed by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst [14], and that on dialogue games conducted by McBurney et al. [12],
and Amgoud et al. [10] contributed greatly in defining its operational guidelines.
More specifically, our protocol consists of six main stages: (i) opening, (ii) conflict recog-
nition, (iii) conflict diagnosis, (iv) conflict management, (v) agreement, and (vi) closing. The
opening and closing stages provide the important synchronisation points for the agents involved
3 Even though we acknowledge the importance of distinguishing the rules of encounter governed by
the protocol from the individual decision mechanisms required by the participants to engage in such
dialogues (see [12]), due to space restrictions we choose to describe both these elements in this section.
Table 1. The Protocol
Locution Effects on CS & IS Next Valid Moves
OPEN-DIALOGUE CS(ai)← OPEN-DIALOGUE OPEN-DIALOGUE
CS(aj)← OPEN-DIALOGUE PROPOSE(l,m)
PROPOSE(l,m)
CS(ai)← PROPOSE(l,m) ACCEPT(l,m)
REJECT(l,m)CS(aj)← PROPOSE(l,m)
IS(aj)← Need(ai, l) ∧ Capable(ai,m)
ACCEPT(l,m)
CS(ai)← ACCEPT(l,m) ∧ l ∧m
CLOSE-DIALOGUECS(aj)← ACCEPT(l,m) ∧ l ∧m
IS(ai)← Capable(aj , l)
REJECT(l,m) CS(ai)← REJECT(l,m)
CS(aj)← REJECT(l,m)
CHALLENGE(l)
PROPOSE(l,m′)
CLOSE-DIALOGUE
CHALLENGE(l) CS(ai)← CHALLENGE(l) ASSERT(l)
CS(aj)← CHALLENGE(l) CHALLENGE(l)
ASSERT(l) CS(ai)← ASSERT(l)
CS(aj)← ASSERT(l)
PROPOSE(l,m′)
ACCEPT(l,m)
ASSERT(¬l)
CHALLENGE(l)
CLOSE-DIALOGUE
CLOSE-DIALOGUE CS(ai)← CLOSE-DIALOGUE CLOSE-DIALOGUE
CS(aj)← CLOSE-DIALOGUE
in the dialogue, the former indicating its commencement and the latter its termination [12]. The
four remaining stages not only adhere to the computational conflict work by Tessier et al.,
but also comply well with the pragma-dialectics model for critical discussion proposed by van
Eemeren and Grootendorst. In more detail, in the conflict recognition stage, the initial inter-
action between the agents brings the conflict to the surface. Subsequently, the diagnosis stage
allows the agents to establish the root cause of the conflict and also decide on how to address
it (i.e., whether to avoid the conflict or attempt to manage and resolve it through argumenta-
tion and negotiation [1]). Next, the conflict management stage allows the agents to argue and
negotiate, thus, addressing the cause of this conflict. Finally, the agreement stage brings the
argument to an end, either with the participants agreeing on a mutually acceptable solution or
agreeing to disagree due to the lack of such a solution. As mentioned above, these four stages
map seamlessly to the four stages in the pragma-dialectics model; namely confrontation, rather
infelicitously termed opening, argumentation, and concluding respectively.
Given the overall stages of our protocol, we now describe its internal operation. Our pro-
tocol follows the tradition of dialogue games [12] where a dialogue is perceived as a game
in which each participant make moves (termed dialogue moves) to win or tilt the favour of
the game toward itself. In such a context, the protocol defines the different rules for the game
such as locutions rules (indicating the moves that are permitted), commitment rules (defining
the commitments each participant incurs with each move), and structural rules (that define the
types of moves available following the previous move).4 To this end, Figure 3 depicts the over-
all structure of our protocol and Table 1 details the different commitment rules and the valid
locutions that may follow each move. For ease of reference, here we address the proposing
agent as ai and its responding counterpart as aj . The commitment rules are shown as effects
on the participants’ commitment (CS) and information (IS) stores (see [10]) and l and m are
propositions constructed in the domain language defined above. The following describes their
operation in more detail.
OPEN-DIALOGUE: This indicates the entry point of that agent to the dialogue. As shown in
Table 1 this would result in an entry in either agents’ commitment stores corresponding to the
dialogical commitment [15] of having made the move (i.e., commitment to the fact that ai has
uttered OPEN-DIALOGUE). An agent receiving an OPEN-DIALOGUE will retort back (if it
hasn’t already initiated it) by uttering the same. This would put both these agents in the opening
stage and their negotiation over actions can commence. For simplicity, we assume that the first
4 Note, this is not intended to be an exhaustive list of rules, but rather the most important ones in our
context. For instance, if the aim of the dialogue governed by the protocol is persuasion, the win-loss
rules specifying what counts as a winning or losing position would become a vital component.
Algorithm 1 Decision making algorithm for
PROPOSE.
Algorithm 2 Decision making algorithm for
ACCEPT and REJECT.
1: if (Capable(do(ai, θi)) ∧ Baido(aj,θj) > C
ai
do(ai,θi)
)
then
2: PROPOSE(do(aj , θj), do(ai, θi))
3: end if
1: if (Capable(do(aj , θj)) ∧ Bajdo(ai,θi) > C
aj
do(aj,θj)
)
then
2: ACCEPT(do(aj , θj), do(ai, θi))
3: else
4: REJECT(do(aj , θj), do(ai, θi))
5: end if
agent opening the dialogue is the one attempting to make its counterpart perform (or abstain
from performing) an action.
PROPOSE: Each such proposal is composed of two basic elements; the action θj that ai re-
quires aj to perform and the action θi that ai is willing to perform in return. Thus, in general, a
proposal will have the form PROPOSE(do(aj , θj), do(ai, θi)). Here, θi could be single atomic
action (e.g., I will perform (or will not perform) a certain action in return or I will make a
payment of a certain amount) or a composite action (e.g., I will perform action (θ1 and θ2) or
(θ1 or θ2)). Therefore, this generic form of proposal allows the agents not only to make simple
offers of payment over actions, but also to make simple or composite rewards and/or threats
over actions. In this manner, it allows the agents to negotiate and also to use social influences
as parameters within their negotiations to resolve conflicts (see Section 2.2). Given this, Algo-
rithm 1 highlights the decision making required to generate such a proposal. In more detail, we
assume our agents to be self-interested, thus, the proposals that they generate need to be viable
on their behalf (i.e., the cost for ai in performing the proposed action θi (i.e., Caido(ai,θi)) should
not exceed the benefit it gains from aj performing the requested action θj (i.e., Baido(aj ,θj)). We
also assume our agents do not intentionally attempt to deceive each other with offers that they
do not believe feasible on their behalf. Therefore, they will only generate proposals that they
believe to have the capability to honour.5 Once received, as an effect of the proposal, aj will
gain the information that ai requires θj and that ai has the ability to perform θi (see Table 1).
ACCEPT and REJECT: Upon receiving a proposal, the agent aj may choose to either accept
or reject it. Now, in order to make this decision, it will need to evaluate the proposal. Similar to
above, this evaluation is also based on two factors: aj needs to have the capability to perform
the requested action and the benefit of the proposal should outweigh the cost of performing the
suggested action (see Algorithm 2). If both these conditions are satisfied the agent will accept
the proposal, otherwise it will reject it. If accepted, both agents will incur commitments to
perform their respective actions (see Table 1).
CHALLENGE: Upon rejection of a proposal by its counterpart (aj), ai may choose to either
forward a modified proposal (i.e., if the reason is apparent such that there can be only one
possibility) or challenge aj’s decision in order to identify the underlying reasons for rejection.
Apart from this, an agent may use CHALLENGE in two other situations (see Figure 3). First,
an agent may challenge another’s right to challenge (demand or question) its decision (see
Section 2.1) if that right is not evident for the agent. This allows an agent to only justify its
decisions to others who have the right to challenge its decision. To avoid infinite deepening
of challenges, we do not allow such challenges go beyond two levels (i.e., challenge another’s
right to challenge its own right to challenge). Second, an agent can challenge a certain assertion
5 First, under these assumptions of self-interest and non-deceit, we believe, viability and feasibility are
the two most important factors to consider. Second, even though we choose to specify the algorithms
at an abstract level that is independent of any domain, by defining how the agents evaluate these costs
and benefits we can easily set these to reflect a given domain. Finally, even though the PROPOSE
locution defined above has both the elements request and reward explicitly present, either can be null.
This allows the agents to express proposals that are mere requests without an explicit reward (such
as demands, pleads, and orders) and solitary rewards (such as offers, gifts, and suggestions) that they
deem to be viable during their negotiation.
Algorithm 3 Decision algorithm for CHALLENGE. Algorithm 4 Decision algorithm for ASSERT.
– In case of REJECT(l)
1: if (REJECT(l) ∈ ∆ai∧reason(REJECT(l)) /∈ ∆ai ) then
2: CHALLENGE(REJECT(l))
3: end if
– In case of ASSERT(l)
1: if (ASSERT(l) ∈ ∆ai ∧reason(ASSERT(l)) /∈ ∆ai ) then
2: CHALLENGE(l)
3: end if
– In case of CHALLENGE(l)
1: if (CHALLENGE(l) ∈ ∆ai∧RCHALLENGE(l) /∈ ∆ai ) then
2: CHALLENGE(CHALLENGE(l))
3: end if
– In case of ASSERT(¬l)
1: if (¬l /∈ ∆ai ∧ l ∈ ∆ai ) then
2: ASSERT(l)
3: end if
– In case of CHALLENGE(l)
1: if (search-Justification(l,∆ai )⇒ H) then
2: ASSERT(H)
3: end if
by its counterpart if either that assertion or its contradiction is not within its knowledge (see
Algorithm 3 where ∆ai denotes agent ai’s knowledge-base).
ASSERT: An agent can assert some fact in two possible situations. First, if the agent is chal-
lenged for some justification on its decision it can assert that justification. Second, if its coun-
terpart has made an assertion (l), but the agent has justification to believe its contradiction (¬l),
then the agent can assert this to dispute its partner’s assertion.6 This will allow agents to un-
dercut and rebut each others’ social reasoning, and, thereby, resolve conflicts (see Section 2.2).
Assert can either result in the counterpart generating an alternative proposal (taking into account
the reason given) or accepting the proposal (convinced by the persuasion).
CLOSE-DIALOGUE: When either the counterpart has accepted a certain proposal or the propos-
ing agent has no other feasible and worthwhile proposals to forward, an agent will utter CLOSE-
DIALOGUE (echoed in return by its counterpart) to bring the dialogue to an end.
Having formulated the language, the protocol, and the decision making functions of our
ABN system, we now explain how these would interact to provide a means for the agents to
resolve their conflicts in a social context. To this end, Figure 4 depicts an illustrative dialogue
taking place between Andy, an agent acting the role of a PhD student, and Ben, acting as his
supervisor. The case is set within a context where Andy has two distinct obligations, both toward
Ben; to finish his thesis θ1 and to write a journal paper θ2. However, due to time restrictions, we
assume that Andy has decided to perform θ1 at the expense of θ2. This choice is in conflict with
Ben’s own motivations. In this context, Figure 4 illustrates how he can socially influence (see
Section 2.2) Andy’s decision by undercutting his justification and, thereby, resolve the conflict.
More specifically, Figure 4 highlights two specific aspects of our language and protocol. First,
it shows how the language component allows the agents to do a straightforward encoding of
the natural language locutions into its respective utterances (see locutions L1 to L8 with its
corresponding utterances M3 to M10). Second, it also depicts how the dialogue progresses
through the six distinct stages of conflict resolution identified above.
4 Conclusions and Future Work
The long term objective of our work is to formulate an agent society that can use argumentative
dialogues to resolve their conflicts. To this end, this paper builds upon our previous conceptual
grounding on social arguments [3] and formulates a coherent argumentation framework that
allows agents to use ABN to resolve conflicts in a multi-agent community. In more detail, we
first define a schema that captures social influences in an agent society and then illustrates the
different ways that agents can use it to systematically identifying a suitable set of arguments to
resolve conflicts in such a social context. Next, we formulate the language, which allows agents
6 Our current implementation uses a simple arbitration heuristic to resolve such disputes. However, this
can be extended by replacing it with either a system based on the strength of justification [10] or a
learning heuristic based on commitment (see Section 4).
θ2
θ2
θ2
θ2 θ1
θ2 θ1
θ2
Conflict Recognition
Conflict Diagnosis
Conflict Management
Agreement
Closing
Opening
θ1
O2
L1 − Ben: Can you finish the journal paper?
L2 − Andy: No, I can’t.
L3 − Ben: Why not?
L4 − Andy: I have to finish the thesis, and I 
L5 − Ben: But you are obliged to finish the paper.
L6 − Andy: Yes, but I am also obliged to write 
L7 − Ben: In my expert opinion, I believe it is 
L8 − Andy: I adhere to your expert opinion, 
        can’t do two things together.
        the thesis and I believe it influences me more 
        than the obligation to finish the journal paper.
        more important at this point to finish the paper 
        than the thesis. You should change your opinion.
        therefore I will finish the paper.
1 1 2
1 2 2 1
2
1
1
2
1
Let: O   denote the obligation to perform     (finishing his thesis) 
 and f  its associated degree of influence.2
and f  its associated degree of influence and 
O  denote the obligation to perform      (write a journal paper) 
M1  − Ben:   OPEN−DIALOGUE
M2  − Andy:  OPEN−DIALOGUE
M3  − Ben:   PROPOSE(do(    ))
M4  − Andy:  REJECT(do(    ))
M5  − Ben:   CHALLENGE(¬do(    ))
M6  − Andy:  ASSERT(Conflict(do(    ), do(    )))
M8  − Andy:  ASSERT(O   & (f   > f  ))
M9  − Ben:   ASSERT(¬(f   > f  ) &  (f  > f  ))
M10 − Andy:  ACCEPT((f   > f  ) & do(    ) & ¬do(    ))
M11 − Ben:   CLOSE−DIALOGUE
M12 − Andy:  CLOSE−DIALOGUE
M7  − Ben:   ASSERT(    )
Fig. 4. Resolving Conflicts through Argumentation-based Negotiation.
to construct and express such arguments, and the protocol that would guide the course of the
dialogue toward resolving conflicts. Finally, we define the various decision making algorithms
that would enable the individual agents to participate in such argumentative encounters. Apart
from the models specified in this paper, in our current work we have implemented these in a
multi-agent task allocation domain (specified in [1]) in order to empirically test the efficiency
and effectiveness of these concepts. In future, we aim to expand upon our current implemen-
tation by designing different argument selection strategies, thus, allowing the agents to adopt
different tactics in resolving conflicts in an agent society.
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